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Abstract
A payoff allocation in a bargaining problem is midpoint dominant if each
player obtains at least one n-th of her ideal payoff. The egalitarian solution of
a bargaining problem may select a payoff configuration which is not midpoint
dominant. We propose and characterize the solution which selects for each
bargaining problem the feasible allocation that is closest to the egalitarian
allocation, subject to being midpoint dominant. Our main axiom, midpoint
monotonicity, is new to the literature; it imposes the standard monotonicity
requirement whenever doing so does not result in selecting an allocation which
is not midpoint dominant. In order to prove our main result we develop a
general extension theorem for bargaining solutions that are order-preserving
with respect to any order on the set of bargaining problems.
Keywords : Bargaining; Egalitarianism; Midpoint domination.
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1 Introduction
In a bargaining problem n players have to agree on a feasible utility allocation: if
they can’t reach an agreement, they will receive zero payoffs. A bargaining solution
is a map that selects a unique feasible payoff vector for every bargaining problem—as
an arbitrator would do (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).
One of the simplest options this arbitrator has is to determine a “dictator” by
flipping a fair coin: the selected player will receive her maximum possible payoff,
while any other player receives zero. The requirement that a bargaining solution
Pareto-dominate this simple procedure has been formalized by Sobel (1981) as the
midpoint domination axiom. It is satisfied by the solutions of Nash (1950) and Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975) (see for instance Moulin, 1983; Rachmilevitch, 2014, respec-
tively); but it is violated by the monotonic solutions of Kalai (1977). Even worse, we
show that the only solution that is monotonic and midpoint dominant is the procedure
above—which, in general, is not Pareto efficient.
We propose a variant of the egalitarian—that is, monotonic and symmetric—
solution that is designed to overcome this problem: the midpoint-constrained egali-
tarian solution, which selects for every problem, among the points that are (coordinate
wise) greater than or equal to the midpoint, the one which is closest to the egalitarian
point. We characterize this solution by four axioms: weak Pareto efficiency, symme-
try, midpoint domination, and midpoint monotonicity. The first three are well-known
in the bargaining literature; the fourth is novel, and the requirement it imposes is as
follows: when the set of feasible utility vectors expands, the only justification to lower
any player’s payoff is that this is necessary for avoiding a violation of midpoint dom-
ination. In other words, all players should benefit from the addition of alternatives,
unless this would imply a violation of midpoint domination.
Technically, we proceed in two steps. First, we characterize our solution on the
class B∗ of problems in which the weak and strong Pareto frontiers coincide. We
then prove an extension theorem for bargaining solutions: A bargaining solution is
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weakly monotonic if it is order-preserving with respect to some (arbitrary) order on
the set of bargaining problems. Our theorem states that a bargaining solution that
is continuous and weakly monotonic is already uniquely determined by its values on
B∗.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some notation
and standard axioms. Section 3 starts by characterizing the unique solution that
satisfies monotonicity and midpoint domination, which is not Pareto efficient. This
negative result motivates our midpoint monotonicity axiom that we propose at the
end of that section. We present and analyze our new solution in Section 4. The
extension theorem and its application are in Section 5. Section 6 contains a brief
discussion.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. Let B¯ be the collections of pairs (S, d)
such that d ∈ S and S ⊆ Rn is compact, convex, and d-comprehensive.1,2 An element
(S, d) ∈ B¯ is a bargaining problem if there is s ∈ d with s  d. The set of all
bargaining problems is denoted by B ⊆ B¯.
The best that player i can hope for in (S, d)—her ideal payoff in (S, d)—is ai(S, d) =
max{si : s ∈ S and s ≥ d}. The point a(S, d) = (a1(S, d), · · · , an(S, d)) (which is
typically not feasible) is called the ideal point of (S, d). The midpoint of (S, d) is
m(S, d) = 1
n
a(S, d) and always lies in S for S is convex.
A bargaining solution with domain B′ ⊆ B¯ is a map F that assigns to each pair
(S, d) ∈ B′ a point F (S, d) ∈ S. Normally, a bargaining solution is defined on a subset
1For x, y ∈ Rn we write x  y if xi > yi for all i ∈ N , we write x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N ,
and x > y if x ≥ y and x 6= y.
2S is d-comprehensive if x ∈ S for any x with d ≤ x ≤ s for some s ∈ S.
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of B rather than B¯. For reasons that will become clear later, it is beneficial to allow
F to operate on this larger set.
Throughout the paper we assume that bargaining solutions are translation invari-
ant, that is for any t ∈ Rn it holds that F (S + t, d+ t) = F (S, d) + t. In this case
one can assume without loss of generality that d = 0 as F (S, d) = F (S − d, 0) + d
for all bargaining problems (S, d). In order to keep notation simple we will write S
for the problem (S, 0).
Let S be a problem. A point s ∈ S is weakly Pareto optimal if there is no t ∈ S
with t s, and strongly Pareto optimal if there is no t ∈ S with t > s. Let WPO(S)
and PO(S) denote the weak and, respectively, strong Pareto frontiers of S, that is
the set of weak and, respectively, strong Pareto optimal points in S. Denote by B∗
the collection of bargaining problems S with WPO(S) = PO(S).
2.2 The Closure of B
Throughout the paper let dH denote the Hausdorff distance.
3 The map dH is a
pseudo-metric, but as B and B¯ contain only compact sets, the pairs (B, dH) and(B¯, dH) are metric space. In particular, it is well known that B∗ is a dense subset
of B with respect to dH . Let (Sp)p∈N ⊆ B be a Cauchy sequence of problems.4 If S
is an accumulation point of (Sp)p∈N then S is bounded, convex, comprehensive, and
0 ∈ S. Moreover, for any two accumulation points S, S ′ one has S¯ = S¯ ′, that is S
and S ′ have identical closures. Hence, S¯ is the unique accumulation point of (Sp)p∈N
in B¯. In particular, (B¯, dH) is a complete metric space and B¯ is the closure of B.
In the following we shall formulate axioms for solutions on subsets of B¯, bearing
in mind that not all elements of the respective domain are bargaining problems. We
3The Hausdorff distance between two subsets X,Y of a metric space with metric d is defined as
dH (X,Y ) = max
{
supx∈X infy∈Y d (x, y) , supy∈Y infx∈X d (x, y)
}
.
4The sequence (Sp)p∈N is a Cauchy sequence if for any ε > 0 there is p such that dH
(
Sp
′
, Sp
′′
)
< ε
for all p′, p′′ ≥ p.
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do so for technical reasons that will become clear later. However, the skeptical reader
should rest assured that we do not impose our axioms anywhere outside B.
2.3 Standard Axioms
For a permutation pi : N → N let pi(S) =
{(
spi(i)
)
i∈N : s ∈ S
}
. A problem is called
symmetric if pi(S) = S for any permutation pi. We start with three simple axioms a
bargaining solution may satisfy.
Weak Pareto efficiency. A bargaining solution F is weakly Pareto efficient on B′ ⊆
B¯ if F (S) is weakly Pareto optimal in S for each bargaining problem S ∈ B′.
Symmetry. A bargaining solution F is symmetric on B′ ⊆ B¯ if F1 (S) = . . . = Fn (S)
for all symmetric bargaining problems S ∈ B′.
Continuity A bargaining solution F is continuous on B′ ⊆ B¯ if limp→∞ F (Sp) =
F (S) for all sequences (Sp)p∈N ⊆ B′ and S ∈ B′ with limp→∞ Sp = S.
These three axioms are well known and have been discussed extensively in the bar-
gaining literature (for instance in Peters, 1992), so we will keep this section short and
emphasize only one point: continuity is typically only defined for sequences whose
limit lies in B, that is on B rather than on B¯. Requiring that it holds for all converging
sequences—in particular those with limit in B¯ \ B—is a stronger requirement, which
we will discuss in Subsection 5.1.
3 Monotonicity and midpoint domination
3.1 Axioms
Kalai (1977) introduced a very appealing notion of “fair” surplus division, by requiring
that each player’s share increase as the cake increases. More formally, he introduced
the following axiom.
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Monotonicity. A bargaining solution is monotonic on B′ ⊆ B¯ if F (S) ≤ F (T ) for
any two bargaining problems S, T ∈ B′ with S ⊆ T .
The most prominent monotonic solution is the egalitarian solution, E, that maps
each problem S to the weakly Pareto optimal point E(S) ∈ S with Ei(S) = Ej(S)
for all i, j ∈ N . Hence, the arbitrator assigns the same (highest possible) payoff to
all players.
Another very simple (although maybe not very convincing) way to arbitrate a
problem S is to randomly pick a player i and allocate to her ai(S), whereas the
remaining players obtain 0. If each player is picked with equal probability, that is
1
n
, then player i’s expected payoff is mi(S). Sobel (1981) introduced the view that
a solution should be at least as favorable as this random assignment; formally, he
introduced the following axiom.
Midpoint Domination. A bargaining solution F is midpoint dominant on B′ ⊆ B¯
if F (S) ≥ m(S) for all bargaining problems S ∈ B′.
There are well known bargaining solutions that satisfy this axiom, for instance those
of Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975).5,6
3.2 A Characterization and a Negative Result
Midpoint domination alone is sufficient to characterize a bargaining solution on hy-
perplane problems, i.e. bargaining problems of the form H = cch
{{aiei}i∈N} for
some vector a ∈ Rn.7,8 For these problems do not contain any point that weakly
dominates their midpoint, one has F (H) = m(H). We use this observation to show
5The Nash solution maps any problem S to the unique maximizer of
∏
i∈N xi in S.
6The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution maps any problem S to the intersection between WPO(S) and
the line from 0 to a(S).
7By ei we denote the i-th unit vector; that is eii = 1 and e
i
j = 0 for all i ∈ N and all j 6= i.
8For a set X we denote by cch(X) the comprehensive convex hull of X, that is the smallest
convex and comprehensive superset of X.
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that midpoint domination and monotonicity together uniquely define one bargaining
solution.
Proposition 3.1. Let B′ be a set of bargaining problems that contains all hyperplane
problems. A bargaining solution F satisfies monotonicity and midpoint domination
on B′ if and only if F (S) = m(S) for all S ∈ B′.
Proof. Let S be a problem, let i ∈ N , and for ε > 0 define Sεi as a hyperplane problem
with S ⊆ Sεi and ai (Sεi ) = ai(S) + ε. (Since S is compact and comprehensive such
a problem always exists.) Then Fi(S) ≤ Fi (Sεi ) = mi (Sεi ) = 1nai(S) + εn where the
inequality comes from F ’s monotonicity. Since this is true for all i ∈ N and all ε > 0,
we have F (S) ≤ m(S). By midpoint domination F (S) ≥ m(S), so F (S) = m(S).
Unfortunately, the solution in Proposition 3.1 violates weak Pareto efficiency; so, this
result should be interpreted as a negative one: there is no bargaining solution that
satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, monotonicity, and midpoint domination.
3.3 Reconciliation: Midpoint Monotonicity
Our aim is to reconcile monotonicity and midpoint domination at least “in spirit”: we
keep midpoint domination, but we shall weaken monotonicity as much as necessary
for the axioms not to conflict with weak Pareto efficiency. This leads to the following
axiom.
Midpoint Monotonicity. A bargaining solution F is midpoint monotonic on B′ ⊆
B¯ if F (S) ≤ F (T ) for any two problems S, T ∈ B′ for which S ⊆ T and there
is t ∈ T with t ≥ m(T ) and t ≥ F (S).
In words, this axiom imposes monotonicity only if doing so causes no violation of
midpoint domination. The following easy lemma is mainly stated for later reference.
Nevertheless, it illustrates important cases in which this axiom has bite.
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Lemma 3.2. Let F satisfy midpoint monotonicity, and let S, T be bargaining problems
with S ⊆ T . If F (S) ≥ m(T ) then F (T ) ≥ F (S).
Proof. Let t = F (S). Since t ∈ T , t ≥ m(T ), and t ≥ F (S), midpoint monotonicity
applies, so F (T ) ≥ F (S).
4 The Midpoint-Constrained Egalitarian Solution
Combining midpoint domination and midpoint monotonicity intuitively translates to
finding a solution that satisfies midpoint domination and is, in some sense, as “close
as possible” to a monotonic solution. Taking this aim literally, we define the solution
E∗ as the solution of the minimization problem
min
s∈S
‖s− E(S)‖ (1)
s.t. s ≥ m(S),
where ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. The constraints s ∈ S and s ≥ m(S) define a
convex and compact feasibility set for any S ∈ B¯.9 As the objective function in (1) is
continuous, this optimization problem always has a solution. Moreover, the objective
function is strictly quasi-convex. For if s 6= t are such that ‖s− E(S)‖ = ‖t− E(S)‖
then ‖αs+ (1− α) t− E(S)‖ < ‖s− E(S)‖ for all α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the solution
of (1) is unique, which means that E∗ (S) is well-defined. We call this solution the
midpoint-constrained egalitarian solution. Our main result is that E∗ satisfies our
axioms—and no other bargaining solution does.
Theorem 4.1. A solution F on B satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, symmetry, mid-
point domination, and midpoint monotonicity if and only if F = E∗.
We postpone the proof of Theorem 4.1 to the end of Section 5.3. We shall first present
an algorithm to compute E∗, from which we can derive an alternative, more useful,
9Note that we do not require that s lie in the (weak or strong) Pareto frontier of S.
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representation of this bargaining solution. We will use the latter in order to prove
that E∗ satisfies our axioms.
4.1 Alternative representations of E∗
Defining E∗ as the solution of a convex optimization problem is in line with our
motivation to reconcile midpoint domination and (some form of) monotonicity. Nev-
ertheless, in order to actually find E∗(S) there are better ways. A simple procedure is
the following: assign Ei(S) to each player i. If E(S) ≥ m(S), then set E∗(S) = E(S)
and stop. Otherwise allocate to each i ∈ N with Ei(S) < mi(S) the value mi(S), and
allocate to all other players the (equal) payoff r that is maximally feasible. Again, if
the new allocation satisfies midpoint domination, stop; otherwise repeat the previous
step. Clearly this procedure stops eventually (after no more than n steps). Our first
lemma formalizes this algorithm and shows that the resulting allocation is, in fact,
E∗(S).
Lemma 4.2. Let S ∈ B. Let I1(S) = {i ∈M : E(S) < mi(S)}. If I1(S) = ∅, let
F (S) = E(S). Otherwise, define recursively
J t (S) =
t⋃
k=1
I t(S)
F t (S) = max
r:((mj(S))j∈Jt(S),(r)i∈N\Jt(S))∈S
(
(mj(S))j∈Jt(S) , (r)i∈N\Jt(S)
)
I t+1 (S) =
{
i ∈ N \ J t(S) : F ti (S) < mi(S)
}
.
Then, there is t∗ ≤ n such that F t(S) = F t∗(S) for all t ≥ t∗. Moreover, F t∗(S) =
E∗(S).
Proof. The algorithm will stop after at most n steps as in each non-terminal step
J t increases by at least one player. So, F t
∗
(S) is well defined. Let F = F t
∗
(S)
and assume that F (S) 6= E∗(S) for some S; that is, F does not solve (1). Let
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ε = E∗(S)− F (S) ∈ Rn, and observe that for all j ∈ J t∗
Fj(S) + εj = E
∗
j (S) ≥ mj(S) = Fj(S).
Hence, εj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J t∗ so that
∑
i∈N\Jt∗ εi ≤ 0. Let r = Fi(S) for i ∈ N \ J t
∗
(which is equal for all such i). By construction r−Ei(S) ≤ 0, so the strict convexity of
the square function implies
∑
i∈N\Jt∗ (S) (r + εi − Ei(S))2 ≥
∑
i∈N\Jt∗ (S) (r − Ei(S))2.
Hence,
‖E∗(S)− E(S)‖2 = ‖F (S) + ε− E(S)‖2
=
∑
j∈Jt∗
(mj(S) + εj − Ej (S))2 +
∑
i∈N\Jt∗ (S)
(r + εi − Ei(S))2
≥
∑
j∈Jt∗
(mj(S)− Ej (S))2 +
∑
i∈N\Jt∗ (S)
(r − Ei(S))2
= ‖F (S)− E(S)‖2
> ‖E∗(S)− E(S)‖2 ,
where the last inequality is true as F does not solve (1). But this is impossible.
A second, very convenient, representation can now be obtained as an immediate
corollary. (The proof is omitted.)
Corollary 4.3. Let S ∈ B. Then E∗(S) satisfies.
E∗i (S) =
mi (S) if mi(S) > rr otherwise, (2)
where r = r(S) is maximal subject to E∗ (S) ∈ S.
In the sequel we will refer to the number r in Equation (2) as r(S). Hence, E∗i (S) =
max {mi(S), r(S)} for all i ∈ N . From here let R(S) = {i ∈ N : E∗i (S) = r(S)} and
note that R(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ B.
Kalai (1977) related his monotonic solution to the social welfare function of Rawls
(1971), which maximizes the welfare of the least well off member of society. We can
establish a similar connection between the latter and E∗.
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Corollary 4.4. Let S ∈ B. Then
E∗(S) ∈ arg max
s∈S:s≥m(S)
min
i∈N
si.
If S ∈ B∗ then arg maxs∈S:s≥m(S) mini∈N si = {E∗(S)}.
Proof. Let S be a problem, let x = E∗(S) and assume by contradiction that there
exists a y ∈ S that satisfies y ≥ m(S) and mini∈N yi > mini∈N xi. Then yj ≥
mini∈N yi > mini∈N xi = r(S) for all j ∈ N , contradicting the optimality of r(S)
in Equation (2). By construction any s ∈ arg maxs∈S:s≥m(S) mini∈N si must satisfy
s ≥ E∗ (S). Hence, if S ∈ B∗ this set has a unique element, namely E∗(S).
4.2 Satisfied Axioms
We start this section by proving that E∗ satisfies the properties in Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.5. E∗ satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, symmetry, midpoint domination,
and midpoint monotonicity on B.
Proof. For symmetric problems, one has E∗(S) = E(S), which is symmetric. Weak
Pareto efficiency is clear from Corollary 4.3, and midpoint domination follows from
the constraint in (1). We show midpoint monotonicity. Let S, T ∈ B be such that
S ⊆ T and such that there is t ∈ T with t ≥ m(T ) and t ≥ E∗(S). Then ti ≥
max{mi(T ), r(S)} for all i ∈ N . Let t∗ be the minimal such point. Note that if
r(S) > r(T ) then t∗i = r(S) > r(T ) for all i ∈ R(T ), contradicting the maximality of
r(T ). So, r(T ) ≥ r(S). Hence, E∗i (T ) = max {mi(T ), r(T )} ≥ max {mi(S), r(S)} =
E∗i (S).
We shall now turn to continuity, in particular continuity on B¯. For this purpose
note that the egalitarian solution is well defined on problems S ∈ B¯ \ B, namely by
E(S) = 0. Thus, the optimization problem (1) has a unique solution on S as well,
namely m(S), and E∗ is well defined on B¯ with E∗(S) = m(S) for all S ∈ B¯ \ B.
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Lemma 4.6. The bargaining solution E∗ is continuous on B¯.
Proof. Let (Sp)p∈N ⊆ B¯ be a Cauchy sequence and let S ∈ B¯ with limp→∞ Sp = S.
Note that any sequence (sp)p∈N ⊆ Rn with sp ∈ Sp has a converging subsequence. Let
sp = E∗ (Sp), and let (sp`)`∈N be a converging subsequence with s
p` → s ∈ S. Clearly
s ≥ m(S) as m(.) is continuous and sp ≥ m (Sp) for all p ∈ N by construction.
Assume that s 6= E∗ (S). Then there is t ∈ S with t ≥ m(S) and ‖t− E (S)‖ <
‖s− E (S)‖. Define a sequence (tp)p∈N with tp ≥ m (Sp) for all p ∈ N, such that there
is a converging subsequence (tp`)`∈N with t
p` → t. Then
lim
`→∞
‖tp` − E (Sp`)‖ = ‖t− E (S)‖ < ‖s− E (S)‖ = lim
`→∞
‖sp` − E (Sp`)‖ .
In particular, for sufficiently large `, one has ‖tp` − E (Sp`)‖ < ‖sp` − E (Sp`)‖, con-
tradicting the definition of sp` as the solution of the minimization problem (1).
4.3 Characterization on B∗
In this subsection we shall prove that the characterization of Theorem 4.1 holds on
B∗. For the proof the following notation is needed: for θ, x ∈ Rn0 let θ◦x = (θixi)i∈N .
For a bargaining problem S let θ◦S = {θ ◦ s : s ∈ S}, that is θ◦S is a positive linear
transformation of S that keeps the origin fixed.
Proposition 4.7. A solution F on B∗ satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, symmetry,
midpoint domination, and midpoint monotonicity if and only if F = E∗.
Proof. By Lemma 4.5 it is sufficient to show that E∗ is the only bargaining solution
with these properties. So let F be a solution that satisfies all four axioms. For a
problem S ∈ B∗ let J(S) = J t∗(S) be as in Lemma 4.2, and note that J(S)∪R(S) = N
and J(S) ∩ R(S) = ∅. We proceed via induction over |J(S)|, so suppose first that
J(S) = ∅. Then E∗(S) = E(S)  a(S) where the inequality is due to S ∈ B∗. Let
ε = mini∈N (ai(S)− E∗i (S)) > 0 and let T = cch
({(E∗i (S) + ε) ei}i∈N ∪ {E∗(S)}).
Then T ⊆ S, T ∈ B∗, and F (T ) = E∗(S) by symmetry and weak Pareto efficiency.
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So, F (T ) ≥ m(S) and T ⊆ S, so F (S) ≥ F (T ) = E∗(S) by Lemma 3.2. Since E∗(S)
is strongly Pareto efficient (recall that S ∈ B∗), we have F (S) = E∗(S).
Let now |J(S)| ≥ 1 and suppose the claim is true for all S ′ with |J(S ′)| ≤ |J(S)|−
1. Suppose without loss of generality that J(S) = {1, . . . , k}, and that k ∈ I t∗(S)
(that is, k is added to J(S) in the last non-trivial step of the algorithm). Let θ ∈ Rn
be defined by θk =
nr(S)
ak(S)
and θj = 1 for all j 6= k. Let S ′ = θ ◦S and note that S ′ ⊆ S
as θk < 1, and that S
′ ∈ B∗. Let x = (m1(S), · · · ,mk−1(S), r(S), · · · , r(S)) ∈ S ′. We
show that E∗(S ′) = x: let z be the unique solution of (1) in S ′. Then zi ≥ mi (S ′) ≥
r (S) = xi for all i ∈ R(S)∪{k}, and zj ≥ mj (S ′) = xj for all j ∈ J(S) \ {k}. Hence,
z ≥ x, and the strong Pareto optimality of x requires z = x.
We now have R (S ′) = R (S) ∪ {k}, that is J (S ′) = J (S) \ {k}. Hence, by the
induction hypothesis, F (S ′) = E∗ (S ′) ≥ m(S). By Lemma 3.2 midpoint monotonic-
ity applies, so F (S) ≥ E∗ (S ′). Since Fk (S) ≥ mk(S) it follows that F (S) ≥ E∗ (S),
and strong Pareto optimality of the latter completes the proof.
5 An Extension Theorem
Let F be a bargaining solution with domain B′, and let B′ ⊆ B′′ ⊆ B¯. A bargaining
solution F¯ : B′′ → Rn is an extension of F to B′′ if F¯ (S) = F (S) for all S ∈ B′. It is
easy to see that the egalitarian solution has a unique extension from B∗ to B: For any
S ∈ B \B∗ can be approximated both from above and from below by arbitrarily close
elements of B∗, say S ′ and S ′′, so that E (S ′) ≤ F (S) ≤ E (S ′′) for any monotonic F .
In what follows we provide an extension theorem that formalizes and generalizes the
above intuitive example; in particular, the theorem allows us to uniquely extend E∗
from B∗ to B without imposing continuity.
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5.1 Cauchy Regularity
Let (X, d) and (Y, d′) be two metric spaces. A map f : X → Y is Cauchy regular
if for any Cauchy sequence (xp)p∈N the sequence (f (x
p))p∈N is a Cauchy sequence as
well. Clearly any Cauchy regular map is continuous. The converse is not always true,
but a sufficient condition is that (X, d) is complete. This insight does not require a
proof, and the following lemma is mainly stated for later reference.
Lemma 5.1. Let (X, d) be a complete metric space, let (Y, d′) be a metric space, and
let f : X → Y be continuous. Then f is Cauchy regular.
Cauchy regular maps from a metric space (X, d) into a complete metric space (Y, d′)
have a unique continuous extension on the closure of X (Spikes, 1981). We obtain
a similar result for (weakly) monotonic extensions of (weakly) monotonic Cauchy
regular maps in the next section, where we will precisely define what we mean by
weakly monotonic. Bearing in mind that E∗ is a continuous map on the complete
metric space
(B¯, dH), and therefore Cauchy regular, allows us then to uniquely extend
E∗ from B∗ to B.
5.2 Partially Ordered Metric Spaces
A partially ordered metric space is a triple (X,, d) such that (X, d) is a metric space,
and  is a partial order on X. Let (X,, d) and (Y,′, d′) be two partially ordered
metric spaces. A map f : X → Y is called order-preserving if f (x) ′ f (x′) for all
x, x′ ∈ X with x  x′.
Lemma 5.2. Let (X,, d) and (Y,′, d′) be two partially ordered metric spaces, such
that (Y, d′) is complete. Let D ⊆ X be a dense subset of X such that for all x ∈ X
and all ε > 0 there are x′, x′′ ∈ D with d (x, x′) , d (x, x′′) ≤ ε and x′  x  x′′. Let
f : D → Y be an order-preserving and Cauchy regular map. Then there is a unique
order-preserving extension f¯ of f on X.
14
Proof. Let x ∈ X \ D. Then, by the condition on D, there are sequences (xp)p∈N
and (zp)p∈N in D with x
p  x  zp for all p, and limp→∞ xp = limn→∞ zp = x. As
f is Cauchy regular both (f (xp))p∈N and (f (z
p))p∈N are Cauchy sequences, and as
(Y, d) is complete, they are converging. Suppose that there is an order-preserving
extension f¯ of f . Then limp→∞ f (xp)  f¯(x)  limp→∞ f (zp). Since the sequence
(wp)p∈N with w
2p−1 = xp and w2p = zp is a Cauchy sequence as well, so is (f (wp))p∈N.
Hence, limp→∞ f (xp) = limp→∞ f (wp) = limp→∞ f (zp), and f¯(x) = limp→∞ f (xp).
It remains to show that there is an order-preserving extension f¯ . For this purpose
it is sufficient to show that f¯(x) as constructed above is well-defined, i.e. does not
depend on the choice of (xp)p∈N. So, let (xˆ
p)p∈N be another sequence with xˆ
p → x.
Clearly (f (xˆp))p∈N converges. Let (wˆ
p)p∈N be defined analogously to (w
p)p∈N. Then
limp→∞ f (xˆp) = limp→∞ f (wˆp) = limp→∞ f (zp) = f¯(x).
5.3 Weakly Monotonic Bargaining Solutions
In order to define any kind of monotonicity for a bargaining solution, (partial) orders
on Rn and on the set of bargaining problems are required. We always equip Rn with
the partial order ≥ and the Euclidian metric.
Weak Monotonicity A bargaining solution F is weakly monotonic if there is a
partial order  on B such that F is order-preserving.
As an illustration observe that any monotonic bargaining solution is weakly mono-
tonic: define S  T if and only if S ⊆ T . Similarly, a bargaining solution is restricted
monotonic (see for instance Roth, 1979) if and only if it is weakly monotonic with
respect to the order  such that S  T whenever S ⊆ T and a(S) = a(T ). As
each individually monotonic bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) is
also restricted monotonic (Peters and Tijs, 1985), they are weakly monotonic as well.
Recall from Section 2.2 that (B, dH) is a metric space and that
(B¯, dH) is a com-
plete metric space. The following theorem is now clear.
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Theorem 5.3. Let F be a bargaining solution that is continuous and weakly mono-
tonic on B¯, and let G be the restriction of F on B∗. Let G¯ be a weakly monotonic
extension of G on B. If for each bargaining problem S ∈ B and each ε > 0 there
are problems S ′, S ′′ ∈ B∗ with dH (S, S ′) , dH (S, S ′′) ≤ ε and S ′  S  S ′′ then
G¯(S) = F (S) for all S ∈ B.
Proof. As
(B¯, dH) is a complete metric space, F is Cauchy regular by Lemma 5.1.
Hence, G¯ is an order-preserving extension of an order-preserving and Cauchy-regular
map from B∗ to B. As B∗ is a dense subset of B and each element can be approximated
from above and from below by a sequence in B∗, Lemma 5.2 applies and there is a
unique weakly monotonic extension. As F is a weakly monotonic extension, G¯ and
F must coincide on B.
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1 it is now sufficient to show that E∗ is
weakly monotonic and that each problem in B can be approximated from below and
from above by sequences in B∗. For this purpose define the partial order  as
S  T if and only if
S ⊆ T, and there is t ∈ T withti ≥ max {E∗i (S),mi(T )} for all i ∈ N.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. E∗ is order-preserving with respect to , and Cauchy reg-
ular by Lemmas 4.6 and 5.1.
We first show that an approximation from below (in the sense of Theorem 5.3)
exists, so let S ∈ B \ B∗. Let S0 = cch ({ai(S)ei}i∈N). Define recursively for each
s ∈WPO(S) and each integer p ≥ 0 the point tp(s) as the intersection of the line from
0 to s with WPO (Sp). Let fp+1 : WPO (S)→ S be defined as fp+1(s) = 1
2
(s+ tp(s)),
and let Sp+1 = cch (fp+1 (WPO(S))). Clearly, Sp ⊆ Sp+1 for all p ≥ 0, and Sp → S.
Hence, for each ε > 0 there is p such that dH (S
p, S) ≤ ε for all p′ ≥ p. Since Sp ⊆ S
and E∗ (Sp) ≥ m (Sp) = m(S), one obtains Sp  S for all p by Lemma 3.2. It remains
to show that Sp ∈ B∗ for all p ≥ 0. This is true for S0 by construction, so suppose it is
true for some p ≥ 0. Let s¯1, s¯2 ∈WPO(S), let s1 = fp+1 (s¯1) and s2 = fp+1 (s¯2), and
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assume that s1 > s2. Let λ1, λ2 ∈ (0, 1) be such that tp (s¯1) = λ1s1 and tp (s¯2) = λ2s2.
As tp (s¯2) is strongly Pareto efficient in Sp (recall that Sp ∈ B∗ by the induction
hypothesis) and λ2s1 > λ2s2 = tp (s¯2), it must hold that λ1 < λ2. In particular
s1− tp (s¯1) = (1− λ1) s1  (1− λ2) s2 = s2− tp (s¯2). From the construction of s1 and
s2 we have s¯1 = s1 + (s1 − tp (s¯1)) and s¯2 = s2 + (s2 − tp (s¯2)). Therefore, s¯1  s¯2,
contradicting s2 ∈WPO(S). So, Sp ∈ B∗ for all p ≥ 0.
We next prove that S can be approximated from above. First note that m(S) /∈
WPO(S) as S /∈ B∗. LetM(S) = {i ∈ N : E∗i (S) > mi(S)} ⊆ R(S). ThenM(S) 6= ∅
as E∗ is weakly Pareto efficient. Let ε > 0 and assume without loss of generality that
ε ≤ n · mini∈M(S) (E∗i (S)−mi(S)). Define Sε = cch
(
S ∪ {(ai(S) + ε) ei}i∈M(S)
)
.
Then, by construction, m (Sε) ≤ E∗ (S). Hence S  Sε. Moreover, dH (S, Sε) ≤ ε.
So, all premises of Theorem 5.3 are satisfied, that is E∗ is the unique bargaining
solution that satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, symmetry, midpoint domination, and
midpoint monotonicity on B.
6 Discussion
The strength of Theorem 5.3 lies in the fact that a continuity axiom is not needed:
if a continuous and weakly monotonic extension is known then it must be unique. A
word of caution is appropriate though: The extension G¯ is unique only on B, but not
on B¯, for elements of B¯ \ B cannot be approximated from below by elements of B∗.
As a simple example let G¯ be such that G¯ (S) = 0 for all S ∈ B¯ \ B. This is another
monotonic extension of E∗ from B∗ to B¯.
The axioms we have used in the characterization are independent: The solution
F (S) = m(S) satisfies all axioms but Pareto efficiency, the egalitarian solution sat-
isfies all axioms but midpoint domination, and the Nash solution satisfies all axioms
but midpoint monotonicity. Efficiency, midpoint domination, and midpoint mono-
tonicity are satisfied by the solution F q with F qi (S) = max {mi(S), t(S)qi} for all
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i ∈ N , where q ∈ Rn0 and t(S) such that F q(S) ∈ WPO(S). Symmetry is then
violated whenever q is not symmetric.
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